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This chapter aims to situate Hegel’s philosophical outlook by illuminating it 
against the backdrop of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy, some early 
skeptical critiques of that philosophy, Fichte’s philosophy of freedom, and finally 
the Spinozistic thinking of Schelling and of Hegel himself. Hegel’s philosophical 
project does not represent a return to pre-critical (or “dogmatic”) metaphysics, 
even though Hegel does endorse some central ideas drawn from pre-Kantian meta-
physics. Similarly, Hegel’s project is not an entirely negative or skeptical one, even 
though Hegel’s thought does incorporate some key insights drawn from post- 
Kantian skepticism. In a sense, Hegel’s philosophy can be seen as an attempt to pay 
off some of the promissory notes that Kant had issued in connection with his tran-
scendental, “scientific” philosophy. The Hegelian pay-off, in rough outline, takes 
place through a strategy that seeks to combine the pre-Kantian thought of Spinoza 
with the post-Kantian thought of Fichte. In the spirit of post-Kantian skepticism, 
Fichte had argued that the mind (or knowing) is radically free and uncaused inso-
far as it is always possible for the mind (or knowing) to question, doubt, and 
negate (and therefore to abstract or separate itself from) what is merely given to it. 
In the spirit of pre-Kantian rationalism, Spinoza had argued that the mind and the 
world are not two independent or separable entities, and so it is a mistake to think 
that the mind is capable of abstracting from or separating itself from the world 
as given. Hegel seeks to unite these two seemingly incompatible perspectives by 
arguing in favor of what he calls “determinate negation.” Determinate negation is 
an ongoing, negating activity that is radically free and unbounded (quite in line 
with what Fichte had argued). But precisely because the activity of determinate 
negation is unbounded and infinite, it is also not an activity that takes place by 
means of abstraction or separation from the world as given (quite in line with what 
Spinoza had argued).
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1  Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy
Early in his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains: “I entitle transcendental 
all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with our way of 
knowing objects insofar as this way of knowing is to be possible a priori” (CPR, 
A11–12). Transcendental philosophy thus involves a certain kind of “return to the 
subject that knows,” or a certain kind of “call to self-knowledge” (CPR, Axi); but 
this is not an unqualified return to the subject. Transcendental philosophy is con-
cerned with our way of knowing objects “insofar as this way of knowing is to be 
possible a priori.”
The term a priori refers to that which is independent of experience, and 
independent not merely of this or that instance of experience, but “absolutely 
independent of all experience” as such (CPR, B2–3). When Kant speaks of “inde-
pendence” here, he is referring to the origin, or source, of that which is said to be 
a priori: that which is “independent” of experience is that which does not have its 
origin, or source, in experience. For Kant, experience is “cognition through con-
nected perceptions” (CPR, B161); and perception is “sensation of which one is 
conscious” (CPR, A225/B272). Hence, to have experience is to have cognition of 
“objects” insofar as such cognition includes not only consciousness of what is pre-
sented in sensation (i.e., perception) but also an apprehension of the connectedness 
of the perceptions that are thus presented.
The project of transcendental philosophy implies not only that there may be 
something about our way of knowing which is independent of experience in the 
sense described. It also implies that what is a priori about our knowing is itself 
a condition of our having any experience in the first place: it is “indispensable 
for the possibility of experience” (CPR, B5). Furthermore, that which is a priori 
about our way of knowing is not just an external condition of our possible expe-
rience of objects. What is a priori in our knowing also plays a role in enabling 
the objects of experience to be objects of experience in the first place. Without 
such an enabling condition, our experience could not be an experience of objects 
(interconnected perceptions) at all, but only a “blind play of representations, less 
even than a dream” (CPR, B112). Without the connectedness of perceptions made 
possible by the a priori in our knowing, nothing could even make an appearance as 
an “object”; for without such connectedness, “all relation of cognition to objects” 
would disappear, and what might otherwise count as an “object” would “be as 
good as nothing for us” (CPR, A111). Thus, the a priori conditions of possible 
experience are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the experienced 
objects themselves (CPR, A111).
Because that which is a priori in our knowing plays a role in enabling the 
objects of experience to be objects of experience in the first place, it is possible to 
speak not only about “our way of knowing” as a priori, but also about the knowl-
edge itself as a priori. Kant thus speaks frequently about “a priori knowledge,” 
and offers a second, slightly different account of what is meant by the term, “tran-
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knowledge, or its a priori use” (CPR, A56/B80). This reveals a further aspect of 
transcendental philosophy as such. Transcendental philosophy involves a “return 
to the subject,” but transcendental philosophy cannot be solely concerned with the 
knowing subject; that which is a priori also belongs, in some sense, to the known 
object; and so the knowing subject, even in its pursuit of self-knowledge, “has to 
deal not with itself alone but also with objects” (CPR, Bix). Thus, for Kant, “what 
alone can be entitled transcendental is the knowledge that these [a priori] rep-
resentations are not of empirical origin, and the possibility that they can yet relate 
a priori to objects of experience” (CPR, A56/B81).
Transcendental philosophy is concerned with both our way of knowing and the 
object-character of the known objects insofar as these cannot be explained natu-
ralistically (or on the basis of what happens within experience). It would be mis-
leading, however, to think that transcendental philosophy aims at providing a kind 
of alternative “explanation” for the occurrences of experience or for what happens 
within experience. For one commonly thinks of explanation as a matter of tracing 
one state of affairs back to another, or of giving an account of one object (or set 
of objects) in terms of another (or others). As noted earlier, transcendental philos-
ophy is concerned not with objects as such, but rather with our way of knowing 
objects and with the object-character of objects, insofar as these are a priori. Even 
if transcendental philosophy does offer what might be called an “explanation” of 
some kind, such an explanation would have to be understood in terms quite differ-
ent from our more common notions of explanation. The kind of explanation char-
acteristic of transcendental philosophy is not based on tracing one set of objects 
or states of affairs back to another. After all, transcendental philosophy is con-
cerned with the very conditions of our being able to speak of “objects” or “states 
of affairs” in the first place.
This feature of transcendental philosophy is also the reason why, for Kant, 
it is possible for transcendental philosophy to claim the status of a “science.” 
According to Kant, no explanatory system which takes its bearings from objects 
of experience can ever be assured of its unity and completeness as a system, 
since the domain of possible objects of experience is inexhaustible (CPR, B23; 
A12–13; B26). Because of this inexhaustibility, there remains the ineluctable pos-
sibility that the discovery of new objects, or features of objects, could force a revi-
sion of such explanations. By contrast, argues Kant, transcendental philosophy is 
concerned with our way of knowing and with the object-character of the known 
objects, only insofar as these are a priori. Since all that is a priori has its own sys-
tematic unity (CPR, Axiii; A67; B92; A474; B502; A845; B873), and since it is 
just such a unity which raises a mere aggregate of knowledge to the rank of sci-
ence (CPR, A832/B860), it follows for Kant that transcendental philosophy can, at 
least in principle, claim the status of “science.” Here, “science” is not to be under-
stood in terms of the more restricted, contemporary notion of “science,” which is 
commonly taken to denote “empirical science.” Transcendental philosophy, for 
Kant, does not focus on what can be discovered within experience about objects; it 
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Along these lines, Kant argues that transcendental philosophy is immune, and 
can recognize itself as immune, to the kinds of revision which might be demanded 
by the discovery of new objects or new features of objects within experience. 
Transcendental philosophy involves no extension of our knowledge of things 
(CPR, A11–12/B25–26; A135/B174); precisely because of this it can be called 
“science.” While the discovery of new objects can never be complete, one can rest 
assured that, in the field of the a priori, “nothing can escape us” (CPR, Axx). In 
fact, transcendental philosophy constitutes the very idea of science as the system 
of all that is a priori in our knowing and in the objects known (CPR, A13/B27).
For Kant, a metaphysical system which is scientifically grounded by means of 
transcendental philosophy will likewise be immune to any further revision or elab-
oration, save in the manner by which it might be expressed or taught (CPR, Axx/
Bxxiv; Bxxxviii). Metaphysics, once it has been placed upon the sure path of sci-
ence, will no longer have to retrace its steps, or attempt any new lines of approach 
(CPR, vii); for the sure path of science, “once it has been trodden, can never be 
overgrown, and permits of no wandering” (CPR, A850/B878). Kant suggests that 
transcendental philosophy will be able to place metaphysics on the “sure path of 
science” insofar as it imitates what has already been done in mathematics and nat-
ural science, where the scientific character of each was achieved by means of “a 
revolution brought about all at once” (CPR, Bxv–xvi).
If transcendental philosophy succeeds in its scientific aspirations and thus in 
laying the groundwork for metaphysics as a science, then it becomes possible to 
adjudicate disputes in metaphysics going back to ancient philosophy by relying on 
the single, systematic vantage point that transcendental philosophy provides. For 
example, Zeno’s claim that God is neither finite nor infinite can be fully justified if 
understood properly in light of transcendental thought (CPR, A502–07/B530–35). 
Similarly, “if we set aside the exaggerations in Plato’s methods of expression,” 
we can appreciate “that which accords with the nature of things” in his doctrine 
of the ideas (CPR, A313–19/B370–75; see also A471/B499). Furthermore, the 
defects which characterize Aristotle’s table of categories can be remedied if the 
content and divisions of the table are “developed systematically from a common 
principle”; and this cannot be done inductively, as Aristotle tried, but only tran-
scendentally (CPR, A81/B107). Finally, the Scholastic teaching concerning the 
convertibility of unity, truth, and goodness can be shown to have “its ground in 
some rule of the understanding which, as often happens, has only been wrongly 
interpreted” (CPR, B113–114).
2  Early Skeptical Critiques of Kant’s Transcendental 
Philosophy
In 1792, the skeptical philosopher Gottlob Ernst Schulze published a relatively 
short work with a rather long title: Aenesidemus, Or Concerning the Foundations 
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a Defense of Skepticism Against the Pretentions of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
This work was presented as a dialogue between Hermias (a representative of 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy) and Aenesidemus (a Humean critic of Kantian 
philosophy). Schulze’s argumentation was ostensibly aimed at the post-Kantian 
theorizing of Karl Leonard Reinhold, whose “philosophy of the elements” or “ele-
mentary philosophy” sought to show that Kant’s transcendental philosophy could 
be understood and formulated in a way that would make it defensible against the 
skeptical criticisms that at the time were being directed against the transcendental 
philosophy. In taking aim at Reinhold, Schulze succeeded in raising serious doubts 
not only about Reinhold’s reformulation of Kantian philosophy, but also about the 
viability of Kant’s transcendental philosophy in general.
Using the character of Aenesidemus as his mouthpiece, Schulze argued that 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy did not and could not deliver on the prom-
ises that it had made. A fundamental problem was that transcendental philoso-
phy sought to account for how we know certain features of objects which make 
an appearance within experience by appealing to what is a priori in our way of 
knowing, even though these a priori conditions of our own knowing do not them-
selves make an appearance as objects within experience. As part of his transcen-
dental argumentation, Kant had directly acknowledged that we as knowers never 
know ourselves as we really are in ourselves, but only as we appear as objects 
within experience. Thus Kant writes that we “know even ourselves only through 
inner sense, thus as appearance” (CPR, A278/B334). Kant had sought to illumi-
nate the object-character of those objects which make an appearance within our 
experience by giving an account of the transcendental conditions of such experi-
ence, even though the “transcendental” source of such “objectivity” remained out-
side the scope of our possible experience and thus unknowable as it is in itself. 
Focusing on Kant’s attempt at providing a transcendental or a priori account of 
human knowing, Schulze observed:
For since we know nothing of what the mind is in itself, as the Critique of Pure Reason 
also concedes, by choosing one derivation over the other [by choosing a transcenden-
tal derivation over an empirical one], we do nothing more than substitute one form of 
non-knowledge for another. After all, if the origin of the necessary and synthetic judge-
ments is to be more comprehensible when traced to the mind rather than to the objects 
outside of us, we must be able to know at least one property in the mind which objects 
lack that would indeed make the origin of those judgements in the mind more comprehen-
sible. But the Critique of Pure Reason has failed altogether to identify any such property 
in the mind. (Schulze 2000, 118)
Kant’s transcendental philosophy, Schulze argues, amounts to an intolerable, 
unphilosophical attempt at accounting for what is more known to us (objects 
within experience) by appealing to what is less known (an unknown and indeed 
unknowable mind which allegedly underlies and makes possible experience, 
but never in itself makes an appearance as any object within experience). For 
Schulze, to explain what makes an appearance as objects for us within experience 
by appealing to the “mind” (which allegedly makes possible but in itself never 
appears within experience) is as philosophically respectable as explaining experi-
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To wish to explain certain properties of our cognitions from a transcendental being, or 
from a supra-natural subject and its modes of operation “in-itself,” of which we under-
stand nothing at all, is just as unphilosophical and as much an encouragement to intellec-
tual sloth as to explain the order and purposiveness of nature, not on natural grounds and 
according to natural laws, but by appeal to a transcendental author. (Schulze 2000, 124)
A young Johann Gottlieb Fichte was deeply moved and disturbed by the 
anti-Kantian criticisms which Schulze had formulated in his Aenesidemus dia-
logue, for Fichte realized that Schulze’s critique undermined not only Reinhold’s 
attempt at reformulating the Kantian system but also the entire Kantian system 
itself. As Fichte wrote in a 1793 letter to his friend J.F. Flatt:
Aenesidemus, which I consider to be one of the most remarkable products of our decade, 
has convinced me of something which I admittedly already suspected: that even after the 
labors of Kant and Reinhold, philosophy is still not a science. Aenesidemus has shaken 
my system to its very foundations. (EPW, 366)
Furthermore, Fichte saw that the problem which Schulze had identified in Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy was related to other difficulties in the Kantian system. 
These other difficulties revolved around the fact that Kant’s transcendental phi-
losophy was committed to the view that an adequate account of human knowing 
must take care to maintain a sharp distinction between human knowing and divine 
knowing. A key difficulty had to do with the question of how one can account 
for the finite character of human knowing without making knowledge-claims 
which, according to the Kantian system itself, were not sustainable as valid 
knowledge-claims.
According to Kant, human knowing (unlike divine knowing) is essentially 
finite. Insofar as it is finite, human knowing is dependent upon that which is 
given to it by means of sensory (non-intellectual) intuition. Human knowing is 
dependent on sensible intuition, and such intuition “takes place only insofar as 
the object is given to us” (CPR, A19/B33). If our knowing were not dependent 
on such givenness by means of sensible intuition, then we would be capable of 
a kind of “originating” or “original” intuition (intuitus originarius). But if we 
human knowers were capable of “originating” or “original” intuition, then our 
activity in knowing would be the very origin or source of that which is known 
by us. In that case, our knowing could not be sharply distinguished from divine 
knowing (which, as “original intuition,” is the full and complete origin or cause of 
that which it knows). The difficulty was therefore the following: on the one hand, 
Kant argued that there is something a priori about our way of knowing; that which 
is a priori in our knowing is not caused by and does not arise out of any encoun-
ter with objects in experience but instead makes possible such experience in the 
first place. On the other hand, Kant argued that our way of knowing—even though 
it is not derived from or dependent on what is encountered within experience—
must nevertheless be dependent on that which is given to it by means of sensible 
intuition.
If human knowing is to be understood as finite and thus as dependent upon 
that which is given to it by means of sensible intuition, then how can one give 
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seem that, for Kant, this dependence could not be understood as a kind of causal 
dependence, since—according to Kant’s own theory—our knowledge of causal 
relations is valid knowledge only insofar as it pertains to objects which can appear 
as objects within possible experience. But if that which is “given” by means of 
sensible intuition and which renders human knowing finite and dependent is not 
to be understood in terms of any kind of causal dependence, then how is it to be 
understood at all? Kant ended up having to argue that human knowing, since it is 
finite and dependent on some kind of sensible “givenness,” is not fully self-deter-
mining but rather limited and determined by something apart from or independent 
of itself. Yet this givenness, which somehow limits and finitizes human knowing, 
cannot be known to stand in any causal relation (or relation of causal dependence) 
with the knower, since objectively valid knowledge pertains only to objects of pos-
sible experience.
For Kant, then, we must think—but never quite know on theoretical, objec-
tive grounds—that human knowing is genuinely limited and finite; and we must 
think of such finitude by thinking of such knowing as being related to and fini-
tized by an unknown and unknowable “transcendental object” or “thing-in-itself.” 
The Kantian system required us to think that human knowing is rendered finite 
and dependent because of its dependence on a “transcendental object” or “thing-
in-itself” that stands outside of such knowing. Nevertheless, according to Kant’s 
own argument, it is wrong to think of such a thing-in-itself as causally related to 
knowing, since the thing-in-itself stands outside of all knowing and all possible 
experience, and causality is valid only for relations within possible experience. 
And so Jacobi complained that Kant’s system of transcendental philosophy made 
it necessary to think of human knowing as being dependent upon an independent 
“transcendental object” or “thing-in-itself” that somehow finitizes human know-
ing. At the same time Kant’s system apparently made it impossible to think coher-
ently about this independent something or thing-in-itself, since the system also 
holds that one cannot licitly think of the thing-in-itself as playing any kind of role 
within a causal relation or a relation of causal dependence. Thus, Jacobi observed: 
“without that presupposition [of a transcendental object or thing-in-itself], I could 
not enter into the [Kantian] system, but with that presupposition, I could not stay 
within it” (Jacobi 1994, 336).
Fichte accepted the criticism that the finite or dependent character of human 
knowing could not coherently be explained on the basis of an allegedly inde-
pendent “something” or thing-in-itself. Furthermore, Fichte saw that problems 
surrounding the Kantian notion of a thing-in-itself were related to problems sur-
rounding the idea which Schulze had identified: the idea that the mind exists as a 
kind of “substrate” which is unknown and unknowable “in itself” but which never-
theless underlies and makes possible the object-character of the objects which are 
known within experience. These two ideas, then, are really two instantiations of 
the same idea: the idea of the mind as a non-experienced “substrate” which under-
lies and makes possible our finite experience of objects, even though in itself it 
never shows up as an object within experience; and the idea of a “transcendental 
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is always a finite knowing of objects within experience, even though in itself it 
never shows up as an object within experience. Writing to his friend Friedrich 
Immanuel in 1793, Fichte put the two problems together. For Fichte, attempting 
to explain the character and scope of human knowing by appealing to an unknow-
able, underlying “substrate” which allegedly makes such knowing possible is not 
essentially different from attempting to explain human knowing by appealing to 
an unknowable, independent “thing-in-itself.” For as far as our own knowing is 
concerned, the idea of an unknowable, underlying “substrate” is nothing other than 
the idea of an unknowable, underlying “thing-in-itself”:
Kant demonstrates that the causal principle is applicable merely to appearances, and nev-
ertheless he assumes that there is a substrate underlying all appearances – an assumption 
undoubtedly based on the law of causality (at least this is the way Kant’s followers argue). 
Whoever shows us how Kant arrived at this substrate without extending the causal law 
beyond its limits will have understood Kant. (EPW, 369)
The system of philosophy that Fichte sought to develop during the 1790s and 
early 1800s—Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre—is nothing other than Fichte’s attempt 
at understanding Kant better than others had previously understood Kant; and 
indeed it is an attempt at understanding Kant better than Kant even understood 
himself. Interestingly, in his own Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had invited read-
ers to try understanding him better than he understood himself, even if this invita-
tion was not issued intentionally, or with full and transparent self-knowledge. Kant 
wrote:
when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in ordinary 
speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even 
better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept suffi-
ciently and hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intentions. 
(CPR, A314/B371)
In his own attempt to understand Kant better than Kant understood himself, Fichte 
went so far as to argue that a philosophical interpreter is not only permitted but is 
indeed required to go beyond “the letter” in order to apprehend “the spirit” of an 
earlier philosopher’s work. It is necessary to go beyond “the letter,” Fichte argued, 
because genuinely philosophical thinking must be pursued freely and actively. 
Adherence to the mere “letter” of an earlier philosopher’s work renders an inter-
preter both passive and unfree, and thus ultimately unphilosophical.1
3  Fichte’s Philosophy of Freedom
Fichte’s attempt to reformulate and complete Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
can be viewed as an extended reflection on what it means for the finite human 
knower to apprehend itself as genuinely free. For Fichte, Schulze’s and Jacobi’s 
skepticism regarding the Kantian system can provide a good starting point for 
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and Jacobi had argued, there is something problematic in Kant’s suggestion that 
an account of human knowing can rely on an appeal to some unknowable, under-
lying “substrate” or some unknowable, independent “thing-in-itself” that alleg-
edly makes human knowing possible. Other post-Kantian thinkers had regarded 
this unknowability (whether articulated in terms of the underlying “substrate” 
or an independent “thing-in-itself”) as a serious defect, which made the Kantian 
system ultimately untenable. By contrast, Fichte tried to show that this “unknow-
ability” was a hidden strength, and that a careful, sustained unfolding of the impli-
cations of this “unknowability” would make it possible to develop a systematic 
philosophy.
A key element in Fichte’s theorizing is the recognition that the “unknowa-
bility” of the underlying “substrate” or the independent “thing-in-itself” is not 
an altogether unknown or unacknowledged unknowability. Rather, it is a kind 
of unknowability that we knowers are able to recognize for what it is: what is 
unknowable—what cannot be known “in itself”—is any given content or determi-
nacy or entity (any underlying “substrate” or independent “thing in itself”) that 
allegedly is what it is (and is known to be just what it is) apart from the knower’s 
own activity in knowing it. For Fichte, to recognize the inescapable unknowability 
of that which allegedly is what it is apart from our knowing, is to recognize that 
no given content or determinacy or entity outside of our knowing is able to cause 
or determine our knowing to be what it is. To recognize this, in turn, is to recog-
nize that our knowing is in a crucial sense free (uncaused, or undetermined, by 
anything outside of it). Another way of saying this is that, regardless of what sort 
of content or material seems to be externally “given” and seems to cause or deter-
mine our knowing, it is always possible for us knowers to doubt whether such an 
apparently external givenness really is—as it is “in itself”—playing the externally 
determining or causal role that it might, at first, appear to be playing.
For Fichte, then, our knowing of the “unknowability” of what allegedly is “in 
itself” (apart from our own activity as knowers) is itself an indicator of our radical 
freedom as knowers. In being aware of our own capacity to question, to doubt, or 
to negate the allegedly independent or “in itself” character of anything that seems 
to be externally “given” to us as knowers, we are also aware (if only implicitly) of 
our own radical freedom. And so an awareness of one’s own freedom is connected 
to a kind of radicalized skepticism about what can be known (a radicalized skepti-
cism about the very knowability of anything that allegedly is what it is, “in itself,” 
apart from our activity in knowing it). Fichte’s emphasis is not on the skepticism 
as such, but rather on the kind of self-awareness that is operative or implicit in 
such skepticism. One might say that the aim of Fichte’s system of philosophy—his 
Wissenschaftslehre—is to begin with such skepticism about theoretical knowing 
(to begin with the inescapable unknowability of anything that allegedly is what is 
“in itself,” apart from its relatedness to our knowing), and to develop an entire sys-
tem of freedom by unpacking what is implicit in such skepticism.
A crucial step in Fichte’s development of a system of freedom is his argument 
to the effect that the unknowability of any independently given “in itself” can-
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the nature of things as they are simply given. Rather, it is an unknowability that 
is manifest, or that prevails, or that counts as an unknowability, only because of 
the knower’s own activity—only because of what the knower actively does—as a 
knower.
In his popular work, The Vocation of Man (published in 1800), Fichte sought to 
explain how the unknowability of things as they are “in themselves” is not really 
a function of any things “in themselves,” but rather a function—a product—of 
our own doing. First of all, argues Fichte, the knower is led to the idea of a thing 
that exists outside of knowing (a thing that simply is, “in itself,” apart from the 
knower’s activity of knowing), only because the knower is not satisfied with—the 
knower is able to question, doubt, or negate—the alleged self-sufficiency or inde-
pendence of any entity that appears as an entity within the knower’s own con-
sciousness or experience:
I find something to be determinate in such and such a way. I cannot be satisfied with 
knowing that it is so, and I assume that it has become so, and that not through itself but 
through an outside force. This outside force which made it contains the cause, and the 
expression through which it made it so is the cause of this determination of the thing. That 
my sensation has a cause means that it is produced in me by an outside force. (VM 42; GA 
I/6, 230)
However, after having posited the existence of an “outside force” in order to 
explain the appearance of an object within the knower’s own consciousness, the 
knower also expresses dissatisfaction over the idea of an allegedly external force 
outside of consciousness itself. For the allegedly external force is not really an 
independent force that is altogether outside of consciousness, but is only a product 
of the knower’s own skepticism and dissatisfaction regarding what is present to it 
within consciousness. The knower thus extends the skepticism and dissatisfaction 
by questioning, doubting, and negating even the independent, “in itself” character 
of the external force that allegedly exists outside of consciousness. In other words: 
the demand that there be something “outside” of consciousness in order to explain 
what happens “within” consciousness—along with the positing of a connection 
between what is “inside” and what is “outside” of consciousness—is just a dis-
guised expression of consciousness’s own ongoing dissatisfactions and its ongoing 
attempts to remedy those dissatisfactions.
Of a connection outside of consciousness, however, I cannot speak. I have no way of con-
ceiving such a connection. For, just in that I speak of it I know of it and, since this con-
sciousness can only be of a thinking, I think this connection. And it is quite the same 
connection which occurs in my ordinary natural consciousness, and no other. I have 
not gone beyond this consciousness by a hair’s breadth, just as little as I can jump over 
myself. All attempts to think of such a connection in itself, of a thing in itself which is 
connected with the ego in itself, only ignore our own thinking. (VM 58–59; GA I/6, 246)
For Fichte, then, no appeal to something that simply is “in itself” apart from the 
knower’s own activity (whether this “in itself” is construed as an “underlying” 
substrate or as an “external” thing) can do any meaningful work towards explain-
ing the knower’s own knowing activity. Even “the consciousness of a thing out-
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capacity” (VM 59; GA I/6, 246). In the final analysis, our activity as knowers can 
be adequately explained only by reference to what is internal to that activity itself. 
That is, it can be explained only by reference to the knower’s own activity of being 
skeptical and dissatisfied with the mere givenness of what appears within experi-
ence, and thus being motivated to come up with the ideas of determining causes 
and external things in themselves.
Two important implications follow from Fichte’s account. First, the knower’s 
awareness of its own freedom as a knower (or what amounts to the same thing, 
the knower’s awareness that no given content can simply cause or determine its 
own knowing) cannot be a representational kind of awareness. More pointedly: the 
knower’s awareness of its own freedom as a knower can never be the awareness of 
any determinate content or entity that appears within experience (including even 
a content or entity that is imagined or thought to be some hidden “substrate” that 
somehow underlies the knower’s own activity as a knower). The knower’s own 
activity as free never directly makes an appearance—it always remains “invisi-
ble”—and never shows up as any kind of entity or presence within experience. 
After all, the knower’s awareness of its own freedom consists precisely in the 
awareness that every given content can be questioned, doubted, and negated, and 
therefore that no given content can cause or determine the knower’s own know-
ing. The knower’s awareness of its own freedom is thus a non-representational, 
non-representable kind of activity and nothing more. It is not an awareness of any 
determinate thing that shows up within experience, but consists only in the activ-
ity of knowing—or perhaps better, the activity of actualizing—the questionabil-
ity, the doubtability, the negatability, or the non-self-sufficiency of any determinate 
thing that does show up within experience. Fichte thus writes that the knower’s 
awareness of its own freedom—an awareness that constitutes the knower’s very 
being as a knower—does not refer to any given content or fact [Tatsache] whatso-
ever, but is simply an activity [Tathandlung], namely the activity of being aware, 
in a non-representational way, of being essentially free and uncaused in one’s 
knowing. For Fichte, the self that engages in knowing: “is an act, and absolutely 
nothing more; we should not even call it an active something” (SK 21; GA I/4, 
200). Fichte’s use of the term, Tathandlung (often translated as “fact-act”) indi-
cates something about the kind of counter-intuitive argument he is trying to make. 
For Fichte, the self that engages in knowing is not nothing; it is a kind of “fact” 
or “deed” (Tat). However, it is a “fact” or “deed” that consists in nothing that can 
be “found” as merely present or representable; rather, it consists in being the pure 
act (Handlung) of knowing (in a non-representational way) that it is simply the 
uncaused, free activity that it is.
The second implication that follows from Fichte’s claim is that it is altogether 
impossible for the knower to “step outside” or “go beyond” its own conscious-
ness in seeking to give an account of that consciousness. That is, it is never pos-
sible for the knower to find any “outer limit” or “outer boundary” to its own 
activity as a knower. This is because any allegedly outer limit or outer bound-
ary that might be found by the knower is—precisely because it is found and 
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or consciousness. Thus the knower’s activity as a knower has a certain kind of 
unbounded, unlimited, or infinite character to it. The knower can never discover 
that its own activity as a knower is limited or bounded from the outside by any-
thing external to it. Precisely because the knower’s activity in knowing is free—it 
cannot be understood as being caused or determined by any underlying substrate 
or independent thing that lies outside of the knower’s own activity of know-
ing—the knower cannot account for its own activity by reference to anything 
that allegedly bounds or limits or finitizes this activity from the outside. Fichte 
wants to hold (just as Kant did) that the knower’s activity in knowing is somehow 
finite. At the same time, he also argues that it is never possible for the knower to 
account for such finitude by claiming to have knowledge of any externally-given 
constraint or limit or boundary (an externally-given thing in itself) which somehow 
impinges upon it and renders it finite. Thus, Fichte does not deny that the know-
er’s activity in knowing is somehow finite; what he does deny is that the knower 
can come to know the finite character of its own knowing by knowing the exist-
ence of some independent thing (a thing-in-itself) that the knower somehow 
knows to exist apart from its own activity as a knower. For Fichte, then, there 
is something infinite, unbounded, and unlimited about the knower’s activity as a 
knower: it is not limited or constrained or bounded on the outside by anything 
which is known to exist outside of itself, but is somehow limited or constrained or 
bounded only by means of its very own activity.
The two implications of Fichte’s account are intimately connected with one 
another. If one were to hold (wrongly) that the knower’s awareness of its own 
freedom were a representational kind of awareness, then one would be hold-
ing—in effect—that the knower’s free activity could make its appearance within 
experience as a limited, bounded thing (that is, an extensive magnitude) whose 
spatial-temporal limits and boundaries were determined by other, similarly lim-
ited and bounded things (extensive magnitudes) immediately surrounding it 
and abutting it in space and time. Yet, as we have seen, for Fichte, the knower’s 
awareness of its own freedom is not a representational kind of awareness, and 
so the knower’s activity is not any kind of representable thing (it is not any kind 
of extensive magnitude) that shows up as an item within experience. It is for 
this reason, furthermore, that the knower’s activity is also a kind of unbounded, 
infinite activity. Rather than being any kind of extensive magnitude (rather than 
being any kind of bounded, representable thing among other things), the know-
er’s activity is more like an unbounded whole (a kind of infinite magnitude) 
within which all bounded, representable things make their appearance but which 
does not, itself, make any appearance. Along these lines, Fichte sometimes 
refers to the activity of the knower as the activity of an “absolute I” (see, for 
example, SK, 97, 109). This is the activity of rational, knowing consciousness 
within which every representable thing shows up, even though the wholeness 
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4  Schelling’s Turn to Spinoza
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling was an early Fichtean follower and enthusi-
ast, but as he grappled with the problems and prospects of Fichte’s philosophy in 
the 1790s, he began to distance himself from the Fichtean system. Schelling grew 
increasingly uneasy about what he regarded as unresolved, interconnected prob-
lems in Fichte’s system. Two of these problems are especially relevant here.
First, Fichte had argued that there was something absolute, unbounded, or 
infinite about the knower’s activity in knowing. However, he denied that this abso-
luteness or infinitude could itself ever become known to the knower as a matter of 
theoretical reason. For Fichte, what is absolute or infinite about the knower’s activ-
ity can never become an item of theoretical knowledge but must forever remain an 
article of faith. To be sure, such faith for Fichte was a matter of moral or practical 
faith, i.e. faith in the meaningfulness of one’s ongoing, infinite striving towards 
transforming the world as given and making it conformable to moral purposes. 
Yet, the absolute or the infinite in one’s activity remained for Fichte always a mat-
ter of faith and never one of knowledge.
Secondly and relatedly, the way in which Fichte presented and argued for his 
system implied that there was something individualistic, subjective, and perhaps 
even arbitrary and voluntaristic about the way in which others were expected to 
appreciate and enter into the system. Fichte had argued, for example, that his own 
critical philosophy (his “idealism” or his system of freedom) was entirely incom-
patible with and thus dogmatically opposed to all systems of realism (or what he 
called “dogmatism”). For this reason, Fichte argued, it was impossible for him to 
provide any kind of theoretical or argumentative “bridge” that could lead realist 
(dogmatic) thinkers into accepting his system. In what has become one of his most 
frequently-quoted statements, Fichte reinforced the impression that entry into his 
system could be achieved only through an apparently arbitrary, unreasoned, and 
voluntaristic “all-at-once” leap into it: “What sort of philosophy one chooses 
depends, therefore, on what sort of man one is…” (SK, 16; GA, I/4, 195). Fichte 
even suggested that he would have regarded his own efforts as a failure if certain 
kinds of individuals (dogmatic or realist philosophers who have “lost themselves” 
through “protracted spiritual slavery”) were capable of appreciating his system: “I 
would be sorry if they understood me” (SK, 5; GA, I/4, 185).
Starting in late 1794 or early 1795, Schelling began to develop the idea that the 
completion of systematic philosophy, and thus the overcoming of the remaining 
shortcomings in Fichte’s system, might best be accomplished by means of a pas-
sage through Spinoza’s seemingly dogmatic (pre-Kantian and unscientific) meta-
physics. Writing to Hegel in February of 1795, Schelling excitedly explained, “I 
have become a Spinozist! Don’t be astonished. You will soon hear how” (Letters 
32–33; Briefe I, 22). There can be little doubt that Schelling’s interest in Spinoza 
was heavily influenced by Friedrich Hölderlin, Hegel’s and Schelling’s mutual 
friend and former roommate at the Tübinger Stift (the Tübingen Seminary). 
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announced his own conversion to Spinozism, Hölderlin suggested to Hegel how 
it might be possible to think about Fichte’s philosophy of freedom by connect-
ing it with Spinoza’s seemingly dogmatic metaphysics. According to Hölderlin, 
“… [Fichte’s] Absolute Self, which equals Spinoza’s Substance, contains all real-
ity; it is everything, and outside of it, is nothing” (Letters 33; Briefe I, 19–20).
In a document that was probably authored a year later (this document is now 
known as the “Earliest System Programme of German Idealism”), the possibil-
ity of connecting Fichteanism with Spinozism is spelled out further. The text of 
this document is written out in Hegel’s hand, even though it is not entirely clear 
whether Hegel or someone else was its original author.2 What is clear, however, 
is that the ideas expressed in the document were ideas that Schelling, Hölderin, 
and Hegel were together discussing and grappling with as they sought to make 
sense of Fichte’s philosophy in light of the metaphysics of Spinoza. The docu-
ment explains that the knower’s unbounded activity as a knower is an activity that 
not only actualizes the knower’s own non-representational awareness of itself (its 
“being for self”) as a knower, but also actualizes the being of an entire world for 
the knower. The knower’s actualization of itself as a kind of unbounded whole is 
also an actualization of the unbounded whole that is the world. For this reason, 
it is possible to speak about the actualization of unbounded knower (mind) and 
unbounded known (world) as a kind of dual creation out of nothing—indeed, this 
is the only kind of “creation out of nothing” that the critical, post-Kantian philoso-
pher can regard as worthy of intellectual assent. Through this activity of “creation 
out of nothing,” both unbounded knower (mind) and unbounded known (world) 
come to be “all at once,” so to speak:
The first Idea is, of course, the presentation of my self as an absolutely free entity. Along 
with the free, self-conscious essence there stands forth – out of nothing – an entire world 
– the one true and thinkable creation out of nothing.3
The Spinozistic and thus anti-Cartesian lesson of the “Earliest System 
Programme” is clear enough: we should not think about mind and world in the 
way that Descartes suggested we should think about them. We should not think 
about mind and world as two different entities or substances (or kinds of sub-
stances) that somehow succeed or fail at entering into relation with one another. 
It is altogether wrong to think of mind and world as two different substances or 
entities at all. One might say that mind and world—understood properly—are 
something like infinite magnitudes that are fully co-extensive, fully inter-penetrat-
ing, fully inter-permeating, and fully overlapping with one another. What is in the 
world as such does not exceed and does not fall outside of what is in the mind as 
such; and what is in the mind as such does not exceed and does not fall outside of 
what is in the world as such. As Spinoza famously declared in his Ethics (Book 
II, Proposition 7): “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of things” (Spinoza 1985, 451). Finally, since mind and world are 
not two different entities or substances but rather two different ways of being of 
the one and the same infinite, unbounded, original activity (an activity outside of 
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thing” (e.g., a transcendent God), which stands outside of this activity and some-
how explains or guarantees the connectedness of mind and world.
According to the Spinozistic view, mind and world are fully co-extensive with 
and fully overlapping with one another, and thus not related to and bounded by 
one another. For if they were related to and bounded by one another, they would 
not be infinite. This leads to the question: how does mind (or knowing) come to 
know itself as the free, unbounded, infinite activity that it is, and thus come to 
know its own co-extensiveness with a world that is seemingly given to it from the 
outside, even though this world is not at all given from the outside but is—like 
mind itself—equally infinite and unbounded from the outside? It should be clear 
by now that the mind (or knowing) cannot come to know this about itself by find-
ing or discovering something that is present to itself as knower. For anything that 
is present to the mind is something that is related to the mind in the way that one 
thing is related to another thing. But if one thing is related to another thing, then 
both of the things thus related must be finite; neither thing can be co-extensive 
with everything that is (neither thing can be infinite), since each thing is related 
to (and thus bounded by) something that is other than it. Stated differently: if 
what is present to the mind is something other than the mind, then what is present 
to the mind is rendered finite; it is finitized insofar as it is related to something 
(mind) that is other than it. Reciprocally, something that is found or discovered by 
mind also renders the mind itself finite, since the mind itself is related to (and thus 
bounded by and finitized by) something other than it which it (as mind) has found 
or discovered.
It appears, then, that mind (or knowing) cannot come to know itself as the 
free, unbounded activity that it is (an activity that is co-extensive with an equally 
unbounded world) by any kind of finding or discovery. Instead, it appears that 
mind (or knowing) can come to know itself only by virtue of what it does, or only 
by virtue of its own activity as infinite. This, however, also seems impossible. For 
how can mind know itself as the infinite, unbounded activity that it is, except by 
somehow becoming an activity that is present to itself (or that makes an appear-
ance to itself) as something to be known? The problem is that anything made pres-
ent to mind as something to be known (even if what is made present is an activity) 
cannot be mind as it is in itself. For what is made present to mind is something 
that is related to mind, and thus is something that is finitized—but in that case, 
it is not the infinite, unbounded activity of mind as it is in itself. In summary: it 
appears that mind can come to know itself only by somehow becoming present 
to itself, or by becoming objective, or by making an appearance to itself. If, how-
ever, it becomes present to itself, or becomes objective, or makes an appearance to 
itself, then it is thereby finitized and thus is not known as it really is in itself.
Reflection on these difficulties led Schelling to conclude, by the end of the 
1790s, that the infinite, unbounded activity that is the activity of mind (or know-
ing) could never become known to the mind (or knowing) as a matter of theo-
retical or speculative reason.4 Thus, in his System of Transcendental Idealism 
(published in 1800), Schelling argued that it is not philosophy but only art that 
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once the only true and eternal organ of philosophy, which ever and again contin-
ues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external form…” (Heath 
231; SW I/3, 627). In his later philosophy, Schelling continued to grapple with 
the meta-philosophical issues that he first sought to articulate in 1800. However, 
he never departed from his quasi-Romantic conviction that reason (or mind) can 
never provide a satisfactory theoretical account of the co-extensiveness of mind 
and world (or thought and being). According to what Schelling would later call 
his “positive philosophy,” the co-extensiveness of mind and world (or thought and 
being) cannot be comprehended or explained by mind (thought) itself, but must 
always be presupposed (in which case mind and world—thought and being—are 
not fully co-extensive with one another, after all).
5  On the Way to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
Hegel had been an early follower and ally of Schelling’s philosophy, but he 
was not willing to follow Schelling into holding that mind (or knowing) cannot 
come to know itself philosophically, or by means of theoretical reason, as the 
free, unbounded, infinite activity that it is (an activity that is co-extensive with 
an equally infinite and unbounded world). Hegel surely agreed that mind cannot 
come to know itself philosophically as any kind of object or entity or substance 
that appears to it, or is present to it, or is related to it. But for Hegel, it does not 
follow from this that mind is altogether unable to know itself philosophically as 
it really is in itself, that is, as it is in its unboundedness, its infinity, and its co- 
extensiveness with an equally unbounded, infinite world. For Hegel, mind can 
come to know itself philosophically, as it is in itself, insofar as it can come to 
know itself as an unbounded activity that is reflected out of, or mirrored out of, an 
equally unbounded, infinite world.
Yet how does mind come to know itself as thus reflected out of the world? It 
does so, as Fichte already suggested, only by means of its own activity: by means 
of its activity of being free always to question, to doubt, to negate that which is 
merely given to it; its activity of being always dissatisfied with the given as given; 
its activity of always driving itself beyond the merely given so as to posit (within 
itself and never beyond itself as mind) a cause whose positing is meant to account 
for the givenness of the given; its activity of knowing (in a non-representational 
way) that no given content as merely given is ever determinative of its own 
knowing.
Hegel accepted these fundamental insights from Fichte’s philosophy of free-
dom; but Hegel developed them in a direction that Fichte himself did not antic-
ipate. Hegel argued that this activity of being free to question, to negate, and to 
doubt, is never an activity that makes an appearance (or that can be known) all-
at-once as the kind of activity that it is. For Hegel (and contrary to the implica-
tions contained in the philosophy of Fichte and Descartes), the mind’s questioning, 
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all-at-once kind of activity. As Spinoza had already argued (against Descartes), the 
mind’s questioning, doubting, and negating activity never shows up and thus never 
knows itself as a global, wholesale, comprehensive doubting of everything (of all 
givenness) all at once. For Spinoza, mind is able to doubt something only because 
the idea being doubted is connected to something else that is not doubted:
if the Mind perceived nothing else except the winged horse, it would regard it as pres-
ent to itself, and would not have any cause of doubting its existence, or any faculty of 
dissenting, unless either the imagination of the winged horse were joined to an idea 
which excluded the existence of the same horse, or the Mind perceived that its idea of the 
winged horse was inadequate. (Spinoza 1985, 489)
Accordingly, the mind’s (the knower’s) activity of doubting never shows up as an 
all-at-once, global, wholesale, world-negating activity, but rather shows up only as 
a kind of movement, or a kind of passing over from one thing (one idea) which is 
doubted to some other thing (some other, connected idea) which is not (or not yet) 
doubted. In a similar vein, Hegel argues (against Fichte) that entry into a true sys-
tem of freedom cannot be an entry that is actualized through the all-at-once “leap” 
of an individual thinker who—in making such a “leap”—sets herself in opposition 
to less capable (or morally obtuse) dogmatic thinkers.
Another way of saying this is that for Hegel (unlike for Fichte), mind knows 
itself as the activity of being reflected out of the world—and thus knows itself 
philosophically as the activity that it is in itself—insofar as it knows its activity as 
the activity of ongoing determinate (and not merely abstract) negation. The activ-
ity of determinate negation is a doubting, negating activity that does not actual-
ize itself by separating itself, or standing apart from, that which is to be negated. 
It does not actualize itself by operating as if there are given, fixed, discernible 
boundaries that can be erected and known as existing between itself (as negating 
activity) and what is given (what it is to be negated). Rather, determinate nega-
tion is a negating activity that negates only by seeping into and permeating and 
becoming immersed in the given. As we have already seen, the turn to Spinoza in 
post-Kantian thought is motivated by the idea that mind and world are infinities 
that are fully co-extensive, fully interpenetrating, fully inter-permeating, and fully 
overlapping with one another. The infinite and unbounded activity of mind, insofar 
as it is an activity of determinate and not abstract negation, is an activity which 
negates by seeping into, interpenetrating, inter-permeating, and mixing itself fully 
(and this means—as we shall see—mixing itself invisibly) into what appears as 
given.
For Hegel, only determinate negation (and not abstract, external, bound-
ary-erecting negation) can allow both mind and world to be the fully co-exten-
sive, fully interpenetrating, fully inter-permeating, and fully overlapping infinities 
that they are. In determinate negation, mind genuinely actualizes the kind of 
unbounded negating activity that it is as mind. It is crucial that determinate nega-
tion is not any kind of activity whereby mind and world are somehow set along-
side one another or bounded by one another or related to one another. Determinate 
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sees itself or finds itself as somehow standing apart from the world and negat-
ing the givenness of the world by means of a global, all-at-once, abstractive, dis-
crete act of its own. By contrast, determinate negation is the activity of negating 
the givenness of the world by means of an activity that fully interpenetrates and 
inter-permeates the world: it is an activity that is immersed in the world and that 
negates the givenness of the world by dissolving this givenness “from within,” 
so to speak. The activity of determinate negation is an ongoing, continuous (i.e., 
“synechistic” in C.S. Peirce’s sense), laborious, world-permeating activity that 
does not apprehend the world from an external or abstractive point of view, but 
is in fact continuous with the world’s own (immanent) activities and negations. It 
follows from this account that mind as the ongoing activity of determinate nega-
tion does not and cannot immediately or directly make an appearance to itself (it 
cannot be known immediately or directly to itself) as any kind of entity or object 
or presence which shows up in the world. Rather, the activity of determinate nega-
tion shows up only as a kind of perpetually operative negativity or non-presence 
in the midst of what is present. It reveals itself only as the ongoing coming-to-be 
of absences or privations in the midst of what is present. It manifests itself only 
as the ongoing vanishings of presences which had been present to mind but have 
now been passed over (negated and doubted) as they make way for other presences 
(which are, for the moment at least, not negated or doubted).
Some insight from the history of philosophy might be helpful in this regard. In 
Book IV, Chapter 12 of his Enchiridion, Augustine famously argued that what we 
call “privation” is nothing that is present or that has being in its own right. Instead, 
our talk of “privation” refers only to what is a kind of non-presence (or gap or 
void or hole or fissure or break) that resides within being or in the midst of what is 
present. It is significant that Spinoza himself held that error or ignorance is noth-
ing in itself but only a kind of privation or not-knowing in the midst of knowing. 
In a similar vein, Hegel holds that the activity of determinate negation (which is 
the ongoing, infinite, unbounded, negating, interpenetrating, inter-permeating, dis-
solving activity of mind) does not itself show up or appear or become known as 
any kind of being or object or presence within the world. Rather, the activity of 
determinate negation makes its showing within the world only indirectly, insofar 
as it shows up negatively as the coming-to-be of privations or gaps or non- 
presences in the world of what is given. It makes its showing only negatively as 
the showing up of instances of absence or not-knowing which reside in the midst 
of what is present or known.
As Fichte had already suggested (though not fully comprehended), the doubt-
ability, questionability, and negatability of what is given within the world of 
appearances need not lead us into positing some kind of thing-in-itself or under-
lying substrate beyond (or beneath) the appearing world. Instead, this doubta-
bility (which appears only as a kind of privation or “known not-knowing” in the 
midst of what is known) is only the reflecting-back of the knower’s (or mind’s) 
own activity, which is the negating activity of being dissatisfied, skeptical, doubt-
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gaps, fissures, and opacities, which show up within the world of being or pres-
ence, are able to show up as such (that is, show up precisely as nothing present 
at all) only because of the knower’s (or mind’s) dissatisfaction or unwillingness 
to accept being or presence as merely given. They show up as privations, only 
because of the knower’s (or mind’s) non-representational awareness that (1) in the 
midst of knowing what is merely given or present, it also knows that no given con-
tent or presence can cause or determine its own knowing; and (2) it is always free 
to negate what is merely present or given (and thus free to go “beyond” the merely 
present or given, even while never going “beyond” or outside of its own activity or 
its own consciousness of the world as a whole).
Furthermore, as Fichte had suggested, the privations or absences, which show 
up within the world of appearance, are instances of a kind of not-knowing that 
resides in the midst of what is known, given, or present. But these instances of 
not-knowing are not altogether empty, blind, abstract, or wholesale instances of 
not-knowing; they are always instances of a known not-knowing. Accordingly, 
these privations or absences can show up in the world as the “little nothings” (the 
little non-presences or privations) that they are, only because they are instances of 
the knower’s own (indirect, non-immediate, “reflected back”) self-knowing; they 
are reflections of the mind’s (the knower’s) own activity of being aware (non-rep-
resentationally) that no given content can cause or determine its own knowing; 
they are reflections of the knower’s perpetual dissatisfaction and skepticism about 
the allegedly independent or self-sufficient character of any determinate thing that 
is merely “present” or “given.”
According to Hegel, Fichte had failed to recognize the possibility of an activ-
ity such as determinate negation. Accordingly, Fichte thought that entry into his 
own system of freedom could be accomplished by the knower only through a kind 
of individualistic, voluntaristic, all-at-once, wholesale, abstract negation of (or 
self-separation from) the world of appearance or being or givenness. By contrast, 
Hegel suggested that there was a way of entering into a system of freedom (which 
at the same time would be a post-Kantian, post-Spinozistic system of metaphys-
ics) through the mind’s (or knower’s) activity of determinate negation. This is an 
activity which negates the mere givenness or being or presence of the world, not 
through separation and boundary-erecting, but only through the activity of immer-
sion, inter-permeation, and seepage into the world as given.
For Hegel, because the activity of determinate negation (the ongoing, negating 
activity of mind) does not and cannot itself show up or appear as any kind of being 
or object or presence in the world, it is an activity that mind, at first, does not and 
cannot know as its own. At first, mind knows the privations, negations, gaps, and 
absences that reside within the appearing world only in an immediate and direct 
way. As a result, it knows them at first only as privations, negations, gaps, and 
absences that appear to belong to the world simply on its own, as if the world 
could be the world itself apart from mind. Accordingly, mind at first apprehends 
the privations, negations, gaps, and absences that appear in the world as if these 
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the appearings and the vanishings, the births and deaths) of things within a world 
alone. This world apparently exists independently of the mind and needs no mind 
in order to be itself as world. For Hegel, even though mind (or knowing) does 
not know itself directly by means of what it sees within the world, it can come to 
know itself (or what amounts to the same thing: it can come to know its own activ-
ity) indirectly, by means of how it sees itself “reflected” or “mirrored” out of what 
it sees in the world as given.
The activity of determinate negation might be likened to the activity of an invis-
ible sculptor. Because the sculptor is invisible, the sculptor is unable to see herself; 
and so the sculptor’s own activity as a sculptor does not and cannot appear to the 
sculptor as anything that is immediately visible or present to be seen. However, the 
sculptor’s activity, not immediately visible to the sculptor herself, can be known to 
the sculptor insofar as this activity is reflected back to the sculptor out of what the 
sculptor does (that is, out of what the sculptor sees as the result of her doing). This 
activity can be reflected back to the sculptor by means of the differences that the 
sculptor’s own activity makes to what is seen; it can be reflected back by means of 
the privations, negations, fissures, and gaps that the sculptor herself brings about 
in the given medium (e.g. in the clay) by means of her own, invisible activity. The 
sculptor’s activity is reflected back to the sculptor, not as any kind of presence that 
is seen as one presence among others; rather, this activity is reflected back—and 
thus knowable—to the sculptor only through the non-presences (privations, gaps, 
and fissures) that the sculptor herself is responsible for introducing into the given. 
The invisible sculptor does not and cannot immediately see or know her own 
activity, but can come to know that activity insofar as she knows the coming-to-be 
of privations, non-presences, gaps, and fissures in the midst of what is visible or 
present to her.
For Hegel, the mind (or knowing) is like the invisible sculptor in this respect. 
It cannot directly or immediately come to know itself as the kind of (invisible, 
non-object-like) activity that it really is. It can come to know itself only indirectly, 
as a kind of determinately negating activity which must be reflected out of what 
directly appears, where this appearing must seem as if it is the appearing of some-
thing other than the mind’s (the knower’s) very own activity. It is for this reason, 
Hegel argues, that the coming-to-be of self-knowing (in the Phenomenology) can 
be actualized only indirectly, i.e., only by means of a methodological distinction: 
the distinction between “observing” and “observed” consciousness. According 
to the argument of the Phenomenology, “we philosophical observers” look on 
in order to see how “ordinary” (“observed”) consciousness encounters various 
objects as given to it and how this other (“ordinary, observed”) kind of conscious-
ness attempts (though always inadequately) to give an account of itself as the kind 
of knowing activity that it is. The argument of the Phenomenology is completed 
when “we philosophical observers” (we readers of the Phenomenology) come 
to recognize that the “ordinary, observed” consciousness which we have been 
observing all along is really nothing other than our own activity engaged in the 
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Ultimately, for Hegel, mind knows itself as the infinite, unbounded activity 
that it is, (1) when mind knows that it cannot be itself as mind, if its activity as 
mind is not reflected out of a seemingly given otherness (world); and (2) when 
mind knows that the world—in turn—cannot be itself as world, if the world is 
not also the otherness (or “mirror”) which reflects mind back to itself and thereby 
enables mind to be itself (as mind) in the first place.5 According to Hegel, the 
Phenomenology of Spirit provides the “ladder” by means of which the unscientific 
knower is able to arrive at the standpoint of “scientific” philosophy. This is phi-
losophy which recognizes itself as having come to recognize that mind and world 
are not two independent or separate entities but in fact are infinite, unbounded 
activities which fully interpenetrate and inter-permeate one another. In the 
Phenomenology, the activity by means of which “observing” consciousness comes 
to know that its own object (“observed” consciousness) is not really an object 
that is external to it, is identical to the activity by means of which “observing” 
consciousness comes to know itself as the fully infinite, unbounded activity that 
it is. For an activity that is not bounded by any object external to it, is an infinite, 
unbounded activity.
Notes
1. For more on this, see Fichte’s set of lectures, “Concerning the Difference between the Spirit 
and the Letter within Philosophy” (EPW, 185–215; GA, II, 3: 315–342).
2. Some scholars have argued that “The Earliest System Programme” was originally written by 
Schelling (or by Schelling and Hölderlin) and that the fragment which we now have is the 
result of Hegel’s having copied what he had read from a now-lost original text. However, 
Otto Pöggeler and H. S. Harris have both argued that this fragment was not only written out 
in Hegel’s own hand, but also originally authored by Hegel himself. See Harris (1972, 249–
257); and Pöggeler (1969, 17–32).
3. This translation of the text is taken from H. S. Harris (1972, 510).
4. Andrew Bowie has helpfully explained Schelling’s problem in the following way: “For 
Schelling, as for Jacobi and Hölderlin, it is clear that the Absolute cannot appear as itself, 
precisely because it cannot become an object…. The issue is simply the problem of reflexiv-
ity, or self-referentiality, which is the key problem of Romantic philosophy…. Any attempt 
to encompass a totality must adopt a perspective outside the totality, and thus include the 
totality in itself only as a relative totality, or face the problem that totalities cannot describe 
themselves as totalities, in that the description must then include a description of the 
description, and so on ad infinitum” (Bowie 1993, 49–50). Accordingly: “Philosophy there-
fore cannot positively represent the Absolute because reflexive thinking operates from the 
position where absolute identity has always been lost in the emergence of consciousness” 
(ibid., 53).
5. Thus there is an important way in which Hegel diverges from Augustine. For Augustine, the 
relation between being (positing, presence) and privation (negation, absence) is an asymmet-
rical one: there cannot be privation without being, but there can be being without privation. 
Hegel denies this asymmetry: for Hegel, privation cannot be privation without its being a pri-
vation within being; but conversely for Hegel (and not for Augustine), being cannot be being 
(it cannot be itself and actualize itself as being) if it does not show up (if it does not actualize 
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